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Abstract
We present a spatial map of the Italian House of Deputies during
the XIII Legislature obtained by applying the Poole and Rosenthal
methodology to roll call data. We estimate coordinates for almost all
the 650 Deputies that were on the House’s floor at the time, and we
aggregate them according to parties. We find that voting patters gen-
erate basically a two dimensional political space. The first dimension
represents loyalty to either the ruling coalition or the opposing one.
The second dimension is represented by the European Union. These
findings are consistent with the exceptional case of the party North-
ern League, which at the time did not belong to either coalition, and
presented itself as a northern, separazionist, and anti-system party.
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1 Introduction
This paper offers a spatial map of the Italian political space as it unfolds
from the final votes cast by the members of the House of Deputies (the lower
chamber of the Italian Parliament) in the course of the XIII legislature (1996-
2001). We use the methodology developed and applied to the U.S. Congress
by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) (PR henceforth) and we then address three
basic questions: 1) what is the dimensionality of the Italian party system?
2) What do these dimensions mean? 3) How do our results relate to previous
spatial studies?
The Italian political space has been investigated for the past three decades,
under a variety of methodologies and in different time frameworks: Party
positions have been estimated using expert surveys data (Warwick (2005)),
mass survey data (Sani and Sartori (1978), Corbetta et al. (1988)), ecological
data (Ricolfi (1999)), and party manifesto data (Budge et al. (2001), Cam-
pus (2001), and Pelizzo (2003)). Little agreement has been achieved about
the number and the nature of its dimensions. Some scholars have in fact
suggested that the Italian political space is or can be properly represented
as uni-dimensional, with parties ordered along the (ideological) left-right di-
mension. This is the interpretation given by Sani and Sartori (1978) for the
mid seventies, by Corbetta et al. (1988) for the 1966-1983 period, by Campus
(2001) for the 1996 elections, and by Pelizzo (2003) for the 1948-1996 period.
Others have argued that the Italian political space is multi-dimensional.
This is the evidence found by Ricolfi (1999) and Ricolfi (2004) for the pe-
riods 1953-1992 and 1994-1996, and by Loera and Testa (2004) who have
investigated the dimensionality of the perceptual space of the voters in the
new millennium. It is however interesting to note that the scholars advocat-
ing the multi-dimensional interpretation of the Italian political space have
not reached a consensus as to what are its structuring dimensions. For sev-
eral decades it was believed that the first dimension of the Italian political
space was the ideological left-right ordering and that the second dimension
divided pro-system and anti-system parties (Sani (1973)). Recent studies
have instead suggested not only that the second dimension might have a
different meaning (Ricolfi and Testa (2002)) but also that the left-right di-
mension may no longer represent the main dimension of the Italian political
space (Ricolfi (1999) [page 31]).
By applying the PR methodology, we can estimate the political coor-
dinates of each party and the dimensionality of the political space as they
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unfold from voting behaviors in the House. 1 We find that the Italian polit-
ical space is best understood as two-dimensional, and we discuss the nature
of these two political dimensions. Specifically we argue that the first dimen-
sion structuring the parliamentary party system is the loyalty to the coalition
each party belongs to, while the second dimension reflects differences with
respect to the European Union (EU henceforth).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reports
a brief description of the institutional factors, section 3 discusses the data
we collected, section 4 reports the estimated spatial map, discusses the di-
mensionality of the political space and its interpretation, while section 5
concludes and suggests some possible venues for future research. Minor
charts and tables are in the appendix.
2 Institutional background
While all the elections in the Italian “First” Republic (1948-1992) had
been held under proportionality formulas, those in 1994, 1996, and 2001
were taken under a mixed electoral systems. After the April 18, 1993 ref-
erendum, the Italian Parliament was forced obtorto collo to rewrite the law
for the election of the Senate and, for the sake of homogeneity, of the House
of Deputies. For the latter, the agreement was reached on a mixed system,
where 475 Deputies (MPs henceforth) ought to be elected in single member
districts under first past the post system, while the remaining 155 ought to
be allocated among the various parties on the basis of a proportional rep-
resentation formula, provided that parties reached a 4% electoral threshold
nationwide.
The adoption of the electoral law n. 277/93, which is known asMattarel-
lum, was intended to produce a variety of positive outcomes: a more direct
relationship between the electors and the elected, weaker parties, as well as
more stable effective governments. The adoption of the Mattarellum failed
to produce all of the expected outcomes, but it did reshape the Italian polit-
ical/party system in a major way. Historically the Italian party system had
been a prototypical case of polarized pluralism (Sartori (1976)) characterized
by the presence of: a party occupying the center-position; a bilateral and
irresponsible opposition; anti-system parties; the prevalence of centrifugal
1Initially we applied the NOMINATE model. In this version we use the Optimal
Classification (OC) model, so that we can keep more bills and more Deputies’ voting
tracks.
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drives over centripetal ones; polarization and ideological patterning. After
the adoption of the Mattarellum, the Italian party system became, however
imperfectly, characterized by a bipolar competition between two coalitions
of parties. The imperfection was due not so much to the fact that the
coalitions were made up of a fairly high number of parties, but rather to
the fact that both in the 1994 and in the 1996 elections there had been a
third, smaller, but by no means negligible pole. In the 1994 elections the
center-left and center-right coalitions were also competing against the Patto
per l’Italia, while in the 1996 elections they were challenged, in the North
at least, by the Northern League (LN). 2 In the 1996 elections the center-
left coalition, known as the Olive Tree (Ulivo henceforth) clearly defeated
the center-right coalition known as the Freedom Polo (Polo henceforth) and
the Northern League. The XIII Legislature was the first elected with the
Mattarellum that lasted for its whole constitutional term of five years, from
1996 to 2001. It presented both similarities with and differences from pre-
vious Italian parliaments. Like all the preceding ones, the parliament in the
XIII Legislature was not able to support the same government for the whole
length of the legislature. During its course four cabinets (Prodi, D’Alema
1, D’Alema 2, Amato 2) were appointed and dismissed by the tiny majority
of the Ulivo coalition. But the parliament elected in 1996 differed from its
predecessors in two major respects: first, it was characterized by an uncom-
monly high rate of party switching, as documented by Heller and Mershon
(2005). Second, it was forced to support fiscally austere measures to allow
Italy to respect the convergence criteria set by the Maastricht Treaty and
to join the forthcoming European Monetary Union. These were the insti-
tutional and the political scenario in which the XIII Legislature operated.
We turn now to the analysis of the voting patterns. Before we do, we will
discuss how the data that we analyze were collected.
3 The data
Voting procedure in the Italian Parliament is very elaborate. In the
standing orders of the House at least twelve articles (with several sub-
articles) regulate parliamentary votes. In particular, any time the number
of Yea exceeds Nay and at least half of the MPs are present (i.e. if the
2The Northern League was a member of the center-right coalition at the beginning of
the XII Legislature. They then exited it, causing the end of the center-right government.
Starting with the XIV Legislature, LN will join again the center-right coalition.
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quorum is met), a bill is passed. MPs that are absent because they are
on parliamentary duty, are considered as present in the computation of the
quorum. Similarly, MPs that show up but abstain, i.e. do not express either
Nay or Yea, are considered as present.
Voting is managed electronically or can be done by raising hand (the
most common), by splitting the house in two groups, or by roll call. In some
specific instances, such as for bills dealing with human and family rights,
constitutional bodies, and electoral rules, voting is secret. In other cases,
bills may be passed within Committees, without involving the whole House.
(See article 92.1 of the standing orders.)
During the XIII Legislature, 905 approved bills were published in the
Gazzetta Ufficiale. 3 Some may have been approved during the previous
Legislature, some may have been passed with secret vote, while some others
may have been approved within Commissions. As a result we a have track
of voting records for 630 bills.
The House hosts 630 MPs. However as some members resigned before
the end of the legislature, and were replaced by others, we have a voting
record of 651 MPs. For any bill we know whether each MP was absent, on a
justified absence, present and voted Yea, Nay or abstained. We just coded
votes Yea and Nay while treated all the other cases as missing. The dataset
so created has been used to estimate MP’s policy positions according to the
PR methodology, and the results are reported in the next section. 4
4 Spatial analysis
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of our estimations.
[Table 1 about here.]
The first row reports the number of bills that are in the dataset, while
the second indicates the cutoff criterium used for rejecting the bills. Thus
roll calls with a majority of more than 99.95% were not considered in the
estimation. This is a traditional cutoff rule in the OC method. As a result,
248 roll calls were rejected (third row) and 382 were accepted (fourth row).
Similar numbers (fifth and and seventh rows of table 1) are reported for
the number of MPs that were available (651) and those which were rejected
(4). The cutoff criterium of 10 (which is still standard) means that only MPs
3The source is the House itself, through its web-site: http://www.camera.it
4A detailed explanation of the PR methodology is in Poole (2005).
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for which there is a record of voting in at least 10 roll calls are considered
(sixth row). Thus we estimated coordinates for 647 MPs. 5
The remaining rows in table 1 show the goodness of fit statistics (per-
centage of correct classified - PCC, and aggregate proportional reduction in
error - APRE) if we estimate a model with one, two, three or four dimen-
sions. 6 Finally, the last six rows report the improvement in, respectively,
PCC and APRE if we increase by one the dimensionality of the model.
The first question of interest is about the dimensionality of the political
space. How many dimensions do we have? Figure 1 reports the plot of the
normalized eigenvalues of the double centered agreement score matrix. A
good way to understand the dimensionality of the political space, in fact,
consists in locating the elbow in such a plot.
[Figure 1 about here.]
As can be seen, it is likely that the overall space may have two or three di-
mensions. In order to have a better understanding of the dimensionality, we
look at the improvements in APRE when we increase by one the dimension.
Table 1 shows that an increase from one to two dimensions improves APRE
by 6.5 percentage points. Moving further to three dimensions only improves
APRE by 1.5 percentage points. Finally, increasing the dimensionality to
four generates an improvement of the APRE of only 0.8 percentage points.
We can therefore safely conclude that the estimated space is most likely
bidimensional, even though one dimension alone explains most of the voting
pattern.
Since the type of bills that are proposed and passed is, to a very large ex-
tent, endogenous to the legislative process, while we treat them as exogenous
in our estimations, we decided to make sure that the low dimensionality is
not just an artifact of this issue. To this end, we coded the estimated bills
according to two main classifications (Clausen, Peltzman), one we made on
5When we used the NOMINATE model we had to set higher cutoffs for bills (0.025)
and MPs (20). The procedure rejected (accepted) 388 (242) bills and 9 (642) MPs.
6PCC is just the percentage of the correct predictions that are generated by the esti-
mated model. Instead, APRE explains how the model can be improved with respect to
the trivial prediction all MPs vote according to the majority. It is computed as
APRE =
P
j{minority vote - classification error}jP
j{minority vote}j ,
and it is equal to 0 when the model does not improve on the benchmark case, it is equal
to 1 when the model achieves perfect classification, and it is negative whenever the model
generates more errors than the benchmark.
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our own (Ours), and one that is is provided by the House itself (Teseo). 7
We then computed the Herfindahl concentration index (H) for any of the
above mentioned classifications, and then we normalized it (NH) in such a
way that it ranges between 0 (maximum spread, that is even distribution, of
the bills) and 1 (maximum concentration of bills in one category). 8 Table 2
reports our findings for any classification of the bills we adopted.
[Table 2 about here.]
The worst possible scenario is if we look at the Clausen classification, which
has the smallest number of categories. Even so, we have that NH is 0.123,
so that the variety of bills passed is just 12.3% far away from an even dis-
tribution. Therefore the low dimensionality in the Italian Parliament is
not a mere artifact of the legislative process, and we can now move onto
understanding the meaning of these two dimensions.
Cutting line angles provide a useful way to understand which dimension
is playing an important role in each roll call. In particular, any time the
cutting line is (close to) vertical, we know that voting goes according to the
first dimension. Similarly, when the cutting line is (close to) horizontal, we
know that voting is mainly determined by the second dimension. Figure 2
reports the distribution of the bills by cutting line angles.
[Figure 2 about here.]
As we can see, the distribution has two peaks, one where the cutting lines are
almost vertical, and one where they are almost flat. The majority of bills is
concentrated around the vertical cutting lines, which confirms the prominent
role played by the first dimension in explaining the voting pattern.
Despite the fact that the Italian political arena is characterized by a
multiparty system, the XIII Legislatures offers us the possibility to compare
the voting patterns within the two main coalitions: Ulivo and Polo. Thus
we define party-line votes whenever at least 90% of the Ulivo coalition voted
7This procedure is taken again from Poole and Rosenthal (1997), where a description of
Clausen and Peltzman classifications can be found. In the appendix we report a description
of both Teseo and Ours classifications.
8Specifically, if we let pi denote the percentage of bills within category i = 1, · · · , n, the
Herfindahl index is computed asH =
P
i p
2
i . Whenever the bills are evenly split, H = 1/n.
Whenever bills are concentrated on one category only, H = 1. Our normalization generates
NH = (nH − 1)/(n − 1), which ranges between 0 (maximum sread) and 1 (maximum
concentration).
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against at least 90% of the Polo coalition. 9 Figure 3 shows the distribution
of the bills with party-line votes by cutting line angles.
[Figure 3 about here.]
As we can see, cutting line angles are closer to vertical when party-line votes
are present.
So what do these dimensions mean? Let us first take a look at the scatter
plots of individual MPs coordinates. Figures 4 and 5 report the spatial maps
for each MP, that are labeled according to, respectively, the party and the
coalition they belong. In particular, parties who did not belong to either
majority (Ulivo) and minority (Polo) are labeled I (independent). Moreover,
parties who changed their support to the Ulivo during the legislature are
labeled UI. MPs’ coordinates are clustered for each group.
[Figure 4 about here.]
[Figure 5 about here.]
To the left of the origin in the first dimension (horizontal axis) we can
find the MPs belonging to the center-left parties, while to the right are
the MPs belonging to center-right parties. On that side, along the second
dimension, members of LN are somehow disconnected from the other parties.
Similarly to the left, even if less marked, MPs of Party of the Communist
Refoundation (PRC). We will discuss in length this pattern when we analyze
the meaning of those political dimensions. For the moment we just stress on
the fact that, overall, MPs are clustered by parties. Table 3 reports three
measures of cohesion that confirms a high homogeneity of voting patterns
within parties. The first indicator is the Rice index, the second one is
Agreement Index (AI), which has been proposed by Hix et al. (2005), and
the last one is Modified Agreement Index (MAI), which is proposed by us.
The basic difference between these three measures of cohesion concerns the
number of voting options that are taken into account. In the Rice index
only (yes, no) are considered, in the AI three of them (yes, no, abstain)
are included by AI, while in the MAI four voting options (yes, no, abstain,
absence) are considered. 10
9The analysis summarized by figure 3 was done by including LN in the Polo coalition.
This does not affect the results and allows for more bills to be considered. Similarly, in
figure 5 LN is labeled as a member of Polo. Nevertheless out analysis keeps the distinction
between LN and Polo clear.
10Specifically, let sij , nij , aij and hij be, respectively, the number of MPs for group j
7
[Table 3 about here.]
Table 3 shows us that there is a high homogeneity of voting patterns within
each party but once we account for absence, some differences arise. We also
have that Rice and Agreement Index are significantly correlated (0.862),
while neither of them is significantly correlated to the Modified Agreement
Index (resp. 0.454 and 0.261). We interpret this as a suggestive evidence
that the role of absence from voting sessions needs to be further investigated.
Figures 6 and 7 report the spatial maps obtained by, respectively, taking
the mean and the median of each party member’s coordinates. 11
[Figure 6 about here.]
[Figure 7 about here.]
Interestingly enough, median coordinates are more clustered than the aver-
age ones, which shows how the overall distribution is skewed towards the
center of the space.
Visual inspection of the spatial maps reveals that, from left to right,
the parties that are more loyal to the (center-left) government are clustered
around the left-end of the spectrum, the LN is located at the right-end of the
spectrum, while the parties belonging to the center-right coalition are placed
in between. This party ordering could be interpreted in the following way:
on the left we have the responsible government-parties, which vote together
to make the government work. We have then an opposition that, while
opposing the government on partisan issues and votes, does not perform
that vote yes, no, abstain or stay home for roll call i = 1, . . .m. The Rice index for group
j is
Rj =
1
m
mX
i=1
|sij − nij |
sij + nij
;
The Agreement index is:
AIj =
1
m
mX
i=1
max{sij , nij , aij} − 1/2(sij + nij + aij −max{sij , nij , aij})
sij + nij + aij
;
The Modified Agreement index is:
MAIj =
1
m
mX
i=1
max{sij , nij , aij,hij} − 1/3(sij + nij + aij + hij −max{sij , nij , aij , hij})
sij + nij + aij + hij
.
11Specifically, we followed a two steps process: first, we computed the average (median)
of MP’s coordinates by group in each bill, considering only those MPs that actually voted
on that bill. Then we computed the group average (median) across all bills.
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its role in a completely irresponsible manner and supports the government
whenever it is necessary to do so. And finally we have an extremist, ideolog-
ically alienated party that opposes both the government and the responsible
opposition. A similar interpretation has been suggested for the two party
case in the U.S. Congress (see Poole and Rosenthal (1997)). We tested this
hypotheses by looking at the change in APRE if we move from one to two
dimensions in the subset of all the bills where party line vote was present.
The change in APRE is only about 1.7%, which we consider small enough
to confirm our hypothesis.
As for the second dimension, our analysis reveals that the EU provides
the best explanation for the change in the dimensionality of the political
space in the Italian parliament. To test this hypothesis we once again
looked at the changes in APRE if we move from one to two dimensions
in each bill’s categories as given from the four bills classifications (Peltz-
man, Clausen, Ours and Teseo). In particular, we consider only those cat-
egories with at least 10 roll calls and 20% change in APRE. For any of the
classifications considered, (see tables 12 through 15 in the appendix) we
find that the foreign policy variable is the one that passes the test (or is
the closest to pass it). Nevertheless, the most striking results are obtained
with the Teseo classification, which considers explicitly the category Euro-
pean Affairs (number 15), and which generated the highest change in APRE
(0.328). The importance of the pro-Europe/anti-Europe dimension in influ-
encing the voting behavior of the Members of the European Parliament, has
been highlighted by Hix et al. (2006). It is therefore interesting to find that
EU-related issues affect the legislative behavior of parliamentarians not only
in a supranational legislature such as the European Parliament, but also in
the Italian Parliament.
Next we look for other evidence to further corroborate our findings. We
use data collected by Benoit and Laver (2006) and perform correlation and
regression analysis with parties’ averages on each dimension. 12 Benoit and
Laver (2006) constructed their data-set through an ample survey, where
country experts were asked to locate each party on 20-point scales for
different issues. We consider virtually all their variables that apply to Italy,
divided in two main sets. The first illustrates party positions on national
policy issues, and includes the following variables: RILE, which represents
the left-right dimension as a super-issue that indicates simultaneously where
a party stands and what a party stands for. Low scores are associated with
12As will become clear later, the use of correlation analysis is needed by the relatively
small sample size we have.
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leftist positions. TASPEN, which is related to fiscal policy. Low scores are
associated with positions favorable to increase taxes to increase public ex-
penditures. This is a variable of interest because at least two Italian parties,
Let’s Go Italy (FI) and the LN were strongly advocating a reduction of the
fiscal pressure. IMMIGRA, which summarizes positions on immigration.
Low scores are associated to a gretaer acceptance of immigrants and asy-
lum seekers. This issue was particularly important in the course of the XIII
legislature for at least two reasons: first, it had represented an important
electoral topic for some parties, such as LN; second, it was perceived as a
possibly destabilizing factor for the already weak majority coalition (Hine
(1999)). DEREG, which is related to the role of the government in the econ-
omy. Low scores are associated to positions favoring high control and regu-
lation of the market. DECEN, which is about the degree of decentralization
of the public administration. Low scores indicate the advocation to a high
level of decentralization. The relevance of this variable is given by the fact
that talks about possible reforms of the public administration were present
during the works of the Bicameral Commission for Constitutional Reforms,
whose existence affected to a certain extent the parliamentary agenda. SO-
CIAL, which codes positions on matters like abortion and homosexuality.
Low scores are associated to more liberal views. This variable is of interest
because it can potentially separate parties on the basis of their receptive-
ness of catholic values as they are expressed by the Roman Church. ENVIR,
which ranks parties according to the priority they assign to environmental
issues. Low scores are for the more environmentalist groups.
The second set of indexes summarizes party positions on a variety of
issues related to the EU such as its enlargement, its role in peacekeeping ac-
tivities, its strengthening, accountability, and authority. This group includes
the following variables: EUPEACE, which deals with the role of the country
in peacekeeping missions. Low scores mean a clear approval of the employ-
ment of Italian troops in peacekeeping missions in other countries. This vari-
able was relevant in the Italian political agenda of the legislature (Bellucci
(1997); Sciortino (1998)): the Italian army was involved in peace-keeping
missions (Bosnia and Albania), and the decision to joint them was quite
controversial. EUACC, which tackles a very important question: whether
the EU should be an intergovernmental organization controlled by national
governments or whether the EU should be a supranational entity with its
own power and authority. Low scores are associated to positions that are
more favorable to a direct accountability to the citizens. EUAUTH, which
is about defining the areas of authority of the EU. Low scores are related to
10
increasing the areas of intervention for the EU. 13
Last, we construct a dummy variable (GOV ) to indicate whether a party
has supported at least one of the governments of the legislature.
We look at the correlations between parties’ average coordinates on each
dimensions and these sets of indicators. The results for the first dimension
are reported in table 4. They reveal that all variables but EUPEACE are
significantly related to the parties’ average coordinates.
[Table 4 about here.]
The results for the second dimension are reported on table 5. As we can
see, no variable butEUPEACE is significantly related to parties’ average
coordinates.
[Table 5 about here.]
Since, in the Italian case, different positions on the left-right dimensions
reflect different party stances with regard to taxation, immigration and
deregulation, some of the above results are expected. 14 For instance, if
GOV is highly correlated to RILE, then it should also be highly correlated
to, say, TASPEN, DEREG, and IMMIGRA. On the other hand, we note
that EUPEACE separates itself from all the other variables (not only those
EU-related) in the passage from first to second dimension.
Finally we regress party positions on each dimension against these in-
dependent variables. Given the small size of the sample, we cannot employ
more than two regressors in any run. Thus, for the first dimension we start
with GOV and RILE to test whether the dialectic government opposition is
more important than the left-right super issue. We find that GOV prevails
and we use it as regressor with any of the remaining variables. Similarly,
for the second dimension we keep EUPEACE and match it with any other
variable.
For the first dimension, the results of our regression models, which we
label M1 to M10, are presented in tables 6 and 7.
[Table 6 about here.]
[Table 7 about here.]
13A more detailed definition of these variables can be found in Benoit and Laver (2006).
14We also looked at the correlation among these variables, and we found that RILE is
highly correlated to TASPEN, IMMIGRA, DEREG, GOV, ENVIR, SOCIAL, EUACC,
and EUAUTH.
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As we can see, tables 6 and 7 reveal that GOV is always significantly
different from zero, and has a coefficient whose magnitute is roughly between
0.11 and 0.25. As for the other variables, when they are significantly different
from zero (like EUACC, EUAUTH, and IMMIGRA) their coefficient is much
smaller (roughly one fifty to one twelfth) than GOV. Overall these findings
seem to confirm the predominance of the dialectic between government and
opposition in shaping the first dimension of our estimated political space.
Our interpretation is perfectly consistent with the fact that a party like
PRC, which traditionally occupied the far left position of the left-right di-
mension, is positioned in more centrist position in our map. In fact, PRC’s
support for the government was weak to the extent that induced Prodi to
resign from Prime Minister. Moreover, our finding can be explained in the
light of the transformation of the Italian party system. In the course of
the so called First Republic, this system was a case of polarized plural-
ism, in which there was limited alternation in government. The Christian
Democrats were members of every government coalition, alternation affected
exclusively the smaller coalitional partners, and the bilateral opposition had
an incentive, under those circumstances, to be irresponsible and take anti-
systemic stances. By contrast, in the new Italian party system, there is a
real alternation in power between a center-right coalition, which has won
the 1994 and the 2001 elections, and a center-left coalition that has won the
1996 and the 2006 elections. As a result, opposition parties have now an
incentive to fence the government on socio-economic issues and to present
themselves as possible members of a future government, rather than compet-
ing on the basis of an ideologically charge, alienated, anti-system platform.
Previous work (Sartori (1976)) had underlined that the left-dimension in
Italy was a constitutional dimension and reflected the fact that anti-system
parties such as the Italian Communist party on the extreme left and the
Italian Social Movement on the extreme right occupied extreme positions
on this spectrum because these parties instead of opposing the government
on the basis of its policy proposals and programs, challenged the democratic
nature of the Italian political regime. The data presented in this paper sug-
gests instead a different conclusion, namely that the opposition between the
parties of the left and of the right, an opposition that reinforces the dialect
between government and opposition parties, is no longer based on consti-
tutional issues, but is instead based on socio-economic issues (TASPEN,
IMMIGRA, DEREG). Hence, as the peripheral alternation, that for Sartori
was peculiar of polarized pluralist party systems, has been replaced by real,
bipolar alternation, parties’ positions in the political space have come to
represent parties’ stances on substantive socio-economic issues rather than
12
their position viz-a-viz the viability of the existing regime.
As for the second dimension, tables 8 and 9 show that EUPEACE is the
only variable that is significantly different from zero.
[Table 8 about here.]
[Table 9 about here.]
This again confirms the importance that foreign, and, in particular, Euro-
pean affairs have played in shaping the political agenda of the XIII Legis-
lature. Moreover, it suggest one particular channel through which the Eu-
ropean dimensions enters the picture: namely, the use of the Italian army
in peacekeeping missions abroad. This result is somehow surprising: as
parties had conflicting views about the opportunity for Italy to join the
European Monetary Union, one could have expected that the rigorous and
costly (in terms of short term economic growth, employment, as well as po-
litical popularity) fiscal measures that were undertaken by the government
to allow Italy to join the Monetary Union would have generated a bigger
and differentiation on our political map. On the other hand, this finding
seems to reconcile with the role played by foreign and defense policies in
our initial analysis of the second dimension, where we compared changes in
APRE by group of bills.
5 Conclusion
This paper offers a spatial analysis of the Italian House during the XIII
Legislature. We found that the Italian political space is virtually two-
dimensional and that the first dimension has a greater impact on the or-
dering of the Italian parties in the political space than the second dimen-
sion. We also found that while the first dimension reveals fairly clearly the
dialectic between government and opposition, the conflict between govern-
ment and opposition is structured by what can be considered ideological
considerations, namely by party positions along the left-right continuum.
Our analysis further suggested that while the left-right dimension remains
the single most important structuring factor, as the literature has argued for
the past three decades, the nature of the left-right dimension has changed.
The left-right dimension, when Sartori proposed his theory of polarized plu-
ralism (Sartori (1976)), reflected party positions viz-a-viz the constitution,
but was not significantly related to parties’ position on socio-economic is-
sues. By contrast, the analysis that we have performed in the course of the
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present investigation, reveal instead that party ordering along the left-right
continuum is closely related to parties’ position on the socio-economic issues
previously identified. The second dimension orders parties according to the
European Union. Last, the overall eccentric position of the Northern League
is consistent with the anti-system role played by this party during the whole
legislature.
Our brief comparison between the Rice, the Agreement and the Modified
Agreement indexes has also suggested that a better understanding of the role
of absence to voting sessions may help highlight some features related to
party’s discipline. While party averages can be used to estimate party posi-
tions in the political space, in a previous version of this paper we suggested
that party dispersion in each dimension can provide a new, behaviorally
based measure of party cohesion. This measure has the advantage of com-
ing from a structural model of voting behavior (rather than simply voting
outcomes). It may be interesting to understand whether (and if so, how)
party dispersion relates to such individual characteristics as electoral district
(majoritarian or proportional), and absence from voting sessions.
The analysis and the findings previously discussed may be of interest for
scholars working on comparative legislative studies as well as for methodol-
ogists. We believe, however, that the results of our investigations may be
of particular interest for Italian politics scholars. The analysis performed
in this paper represents the first attempt, to our knowledge, to gain a bet-
ter understanding of the Italian political space by applying the Poole and
Rosenthal methodology to the voting record of Italian MPs. Our analysis,
as we have underlined throughout the paper, were carried by using the data
concerning the XIII legislature, when the center-left coalition, Ulivo, was
in power. We believe that it may be of great interest for Italian politics
experts to replicate the analysis we have conducted for the XIII Legisla-
ture with the data from the recently concluded XIV legislature, where the
center-right coalition, which included the Polo and Lega Nord, was in power
and with a larger majority. It will be therefore interesting to see whether
and to what extent a change in the size and in the ideological outlook of the
government majority affects the dimensionality of the political space, the
geography of party positions, and the cohesion of Italian parties.
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A Tables and charts
In this section we report tables and charts of our analysis. Table 10 reports
the classification in Teseo. The code number in the second column indicates
how we aggregated those bills into 16 categories. Table 11 reports Ours
classification.
[Table 10 about here.]
[Table 11 about here.]
Tables 12 through 15 report the change in APRE from one to two, from
two to three, and from three to four dimensions by bill according to the
classifications we have used. Last, table 16 reports the list of parties sitting
in the Parliament.
[Table 12 about here.]
[Table 13 about here.]
[Table 14 about here.]
[Table 15 about here.]
[Table 16 about here.]
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Figure 1: Normalized eigenvalues of the double centered agreement score
matrix as indicators of dimensionality of the political space.
18
Figure 2: Distribution of bills by cutting line angles
19
Figure 3: Distribution of bills with party-line vote by cutting line angles
20
Figure 4: Individual MPs’ coordinates.
21
Figure 5: Individual MPs’ coordinates.
22
Figure 6: Average coordinates by parties
23
Figure 7: Median coordinates by parties
24
Table 1: Summary statistics.
SUMMARY STATISTICS
ROLL-CALLS READ 630
CUTOFF 0.005
NUMBER REJECTED 248
NUMBER ACCEPTED 382
LEGISLATORS READ 651
CUTOFF 10
NUMBER REJECTED 4
NUMBER ACCEPTED 647
PCC1 97.914
PCC2 98.861
PCC3 99.082
PCC4 99.197
APRE1 0.857
APRE2 0.922
APRE3 0.937
APRE4 0.945
∆PCC2 0.947
∆PCC3 0.222
∆PCC4 0.115
∆APRE2 0.065
∆APRE3 0.015
∆APRE4 0.008
25
Table 2: Dispersion indexes for estimated bills. H is Herfindahl index. Max
spread is the minimum value for H. NH is the normalized Herfindahl index.
CLASSIFICATIONS CATEGORIES H MAXSPREAD NH
TESEO 16 0.107 0.063 0.048
PELTZMAN 12 0.169 0.083 0.093
OURS 17 0.154 0.059 0.101
CLAUSEN 6 0.269 0.167 0.123
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Table 3: Agreement indexes for each party.
GROUP RICE AI MAI
1 0.919 0.932 0.504
2 0.955 0.925 0.537
3 0.993 0.989 0.747
4 0.982 0.969 0.543
5 0.991 0.987 0.615
6 0.996 0.986 0.568
7 0.876 0.823 0.555
8 0.989 0.988 0.604
9 0.980 0.957 0.550
10 0.989 0.984 0.570
11 0.991 0.988 0.572
12 0.995 0.914 0.743
13 0.978 0.945 0.603
14 0.998 0.991 0.780
15 0.998 0.989 0.779
16 0.992 0.988 0.499
17 0.951 0.938 0.529
97 0.970 0.936 0.523
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Table 4: Correlation analysis between party’s average on the first dimension
and party positions on issues. ** represent significant at 5%.
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT
GOV -0.925**
DECEN -0.152
DEREG 0.652**
ENVIR 0.844**
EUACC 0.955**
EUAUTH 0.873**
EUPEACE -0.151
IMMIGRA 0.946**
SOCIAL 0.821**
TASPEN 0.762**
RILE 0.906**
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Table 5: Correlation analysis between party’s average on the second dimen-
sion and party positions on issues.** represent significant at 5%.
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT
GOV 0.296
DECEN -0.202
DEREG -0.285
ENVIR -0.256
EUACC 0.087
EUAUTH 0.323
EUPEACE 0.842**
IMMIGRA -0.079
SOCIAL -0.400
TASPEN -0.310
RILE -0.362
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Table 6: OLS estimates of the average first dimension of each party. Part a.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
MEAN1 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
GOV -0.145 -0.233 -0.223 -0.184 -0.106
(0.063 ) (0.031 ) (0.043 ) (0.055 ) (0.030 )
RILE 0.010
(0.006 )
DECEN -0.004
(0.005 )
DEREG 0.002
(0.005 )
ENVIR 0.007
(0.006 )
EUACC 0.020
(0.004 )
CONS -0.044 0.142 0.076 0.003 -0.162
(0.094 ) (0.052 ) (0.069 ) (0.093 ) (0.052 )
Adj. R2 0.861 0.837 0.826 0.844 0.955
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Table 7: OLS estimates of the average first dimension of each party. Part b.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
MEAN1 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10
GOV -0.156 -0.246 -0.112 -0.206 -0.210
(0.027 ) (0.031 ) (0.033 ) (0.060 ) (0.049 )
EUAUTH 0.013
(0.003 )
EUPEACE 0.005
(0.004 )
IMMIGRA 0.014
(0.003 )
SOCIAL 0.003
(0.005 )
TASPEN 0.004
(0.006 )
CONS -0.063 0.061 -0.084 0.053 0.053
(0.043 ) (0.040 ) (0.044 ) (0.090 ) (0.079 )
Adj. R2 0.937 0.848 0.944 0.829 0.831
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Table 8: OLS of the average second dimension of each party. Part a. Stan-
dard errors are in parenthesis.
MEAN2 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
EUPEACE 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.027 0.025
(0.006 ) (0.004 ) (0.006 ) (0.006 ) (0.005 )
RILE 0.002
(0.005 )
DECEN -0.011
(0.006 )
DEREG 0.006
(0.006 )
ENVIR 0.005
(0.005 )
EUACC 0.003
(0.005 )
CONS 0.026 -0.099 -0.273 -0.271 -0.225
(0.092 ) (0.066 ) (0.095 ) (0.093 ) (0.074 )
Adj. R2 0.654 0.754 0.678 0.679 0.657
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Table 9: OLS of the average second dimension of each party. Part b. Stan-
dard errors are in parenthesis.
MEAN2 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10
EUPEACE 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.026 0.027
(0.005 ) (0.006 ) (0.005 ) (0.006 ) (0.006 )
EUAUTH 0.004
(0.005 )
GOV 0.008
(0.043 )
IMMIGRA 0.003
(0.004 )
SOCIAL 0.002
(0.004 )
TASPEN 0.004
(0.006 )
CONS -0.222 -0.197 -0.235 -0.234 -0.255
(0.062 ) (0.055 ) (0.069 ) (0.097 ) (0.095 )
Adj. R2 0.669 0.646 0.672 0.653 0.666
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Table 10: Teseo classification of bills.
TESEO CLASSIFICATION CODE
CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS 1
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS 1
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2
FOREIGN TRADE 2
AGRICULTURE 3
HEALTH SECTOR 4
BANKS, CREDIT AND MONEY 5
BUDGET 5
STOCK EXCHANGE AND FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES 5
PUBLIC FINANCE AND TAXES 5
PUBLIC ECONOMY AND PRIVATIZATIONS 5
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND ARMY 6
FAMILY AND CHILDHOOD 7
SOUTHERN ITALY AND DEPRESSED AREAS 7
ENVIRONMENT 8
SOCIAL SECURITY AND WELFARE 9
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT 9
PUBLIC SECTOR 9
UNIONS AND WORKERS RIGHTS 9
LOCAL AND REGIONAL PUBLIC FINANCE 10
REGIONS AND LOCAL AUTONOMIES 10
CONSUMERS PROTECTION 11
COMMERCIAL AND CORPORATE LAW 11
ENERGY 11
INDUSTRY AND CRAFTMANSHIP 11
CULTURE, ENTERTAINMENT, SPORT AND TOURISM 12
EDUCATION AND RESEARCH 12
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION 13
TRANSPORTATIONS 13
PUBLIC WORKS AND HOUSING 14
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 15
LAW AND JUSTICE 16
PUBLIC ORDER AND POLICE FORCES 16
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Table 11: Ours classification of bills.
OURS CODE
CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS 1
LAW AND JUSTICE 2
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 3
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND ARMY 4
BUDGET, PUBLIC FINANCE AND TAXES 5
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 6
EDUCATION AND RESEARCH 7
ENVIRONMENT 8
TRANSPORTATION 9
HEALTH 10
LABOR 11
WELFARE AND SOCIAL POLICY 12
AGRICULTURE 13
DELEGATION, RATIFICATION, EXTENSION OF TERMS 14
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION 15
INTERNAL AFFAIRS 16
OTHERS 0
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Table 12: Changes in APRE in Teseo classification.
CAT NBILLS APRE1 APRE2 DAPRE2
1 27 0.738 0.876 0.138
2 131 0.646 0.793 0.147
3 15 0.903 0.929 0.026
4 19 0.926 0.938 0.012
5 51 0.944 0.973 0.029
6 33 0.717 0.880 0.163
7 7 0.927 0.953 0.026
8 18 0.815 0.869 0.053
9 46 0.877 0.933 0.055
10 9 0.875 0.935 0.060
11 20 0.866 0.931 0.065
12 51 0.834 0.894 0.060
13 32 0.883 0.936 0.053
14 14 0.936 0.971 0.035
16 48 0.824 0.861 0.037
15 24 0.426 0.754 0.328
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Table 13: Changes in APRE in Ours classification.
CAT NBILLS APRE1 APRE2 DAPRE2
0 22 0.898 0.943 0.045
1 26 0.684 0.860 0.176
2 19 0.853 0.883 0.030
3 34 0.701 0.898 0.198
4 9 0.836 0.950 0.113
5 37 0.951 0.981 0.029
6 12 0.924 0.962 0.038
7 13 0.881 0.915 0.034
8 5 0.859 0.900 0.041
9 12 0.942 0.966 0.024
10 9 0.912 0.934 0.022
11 8 0.651 0.795 0.144
12 12 0.941 0.955 0.014
13 11 0.926 0.941 0.015
14 131 0.672 0.812 0.139
15 5 0.833 0.957 0.124
16 17 0.901 0.922 0.021
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Table 14: Changes in APRE in Peltzman classifications.
CAT NBILLS APRE1 APRE2 DAPRE2
1 28 0.965 0.984 0.019
2 40 0.924 0.950 0.026
3 41 0.860 0.935 0.076
4 35 0.915 0.947 0.032
5 18 0.950 0.965 0.015
8 73 0.800 0.886 0.086
9 3 0.757 0.770 0.014
10 1 0.981 0.990 0.010
61 4 0.728 0.869 0.141
62 19 0.715 0.858 0.144
71 9 0.843 0.951 0.108
72 120 0.479 0.717 0.238
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Table 15: Changes in APRE in Clausen classifications.
CAT NBILLS APRE1 APRE2 DAPRE2
1 106 0.919 0.963 0.044
2 40 0.895 0.926 0.032
3 13 0.924 0.947 0.024
4 18 0.827 0.888 0.061
5 152 0.628 0.803 0.176
6 53 0.806 0.894 0.088
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Table 16: Parties sitting in the House during the XIII Legislature
GROUP NAME CODE
LET’S GO ITALY (FI) 1
NORTHERN LEAGUE (LN) 2
DEMOCRATS OF THE LEFT (DS) 3
DEMOCRATS (DE) 4
POPULAR PARTY (PP) 5
UNION OF THE DEMOCRATS FOR
EUROPE (UDEUR) 6
MIXED 7
MIXED ITALIAN SOCIALIST
DEMOCRATS (SDI) 8
MIXED CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC
CENTER (CCD) 9
MIXED ITALIAN RENEWAL (RI) 10
MIXED PARTY OF THE COMMUNIST
REFORMATION (PRC) 11
MIXED SEGNI PACT 12
MIXED GREEN 13
MIXED LINGUISTIC MINORITIES 14
MIXED FEDERATION OF LIBERALS,
DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICANS (FLDR) 15
PARTY OF THE ITALIAN
COMMUNISTS (PdCI) 16
NATIONAL ALLIANCE (AN) 17
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC
UNITED (UDR/CDU) 97
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